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Abstract: Association rule mining is one of the data mining techniques used to extract hidden knowledge from large
datasets. This hidden knowledge contains useful and confidential information that users want to keep private from
the public. Similarly, privacy preserving data mining techniques are used to preserve such confidential information or
restrictive patterns from unauthorized access. The pattern can be represented in the form of a frequent itemset or
association rule. Furthermore, a rule or pattern is marked as sensitive if its disclosure risk is above a given threshold.
Numerous techniques have been used to hide sensitive association rules by performing some modifications in the original
dataset. Due to these modifications, some nonrestrictive patterns may be lost, called lost rules, and new patterns are
also generated, known as ghost rules. In the current research work, a genetic algorithm is used to counter the side effects
of lost rules and ghost rules. Moreover, the technique can be applied for small as well as for large datasets in the domain
of medical, military, and business datasets.
Key words: Privacy preserving data mining, association rules, sensitive association rules hiding, genetic algorithm

1. Introduction
Organizations such as customer relationship management, the telecommunication industry, financial sector investment trends, web technologies, demand and supply analysis, direct marketing, health industry, e-commerce,
stocks and real estate, understanding consumer research marketing, e-commerce, and product analysis generate
huge amounts of data that often contain useful information (i.e. name, address, age, salary, social security
number, type of disease, and the like). Through data mining, we are able to extract useful and previously
unknown information that organizations or individuals do not want to disclose to the public. Therefore, privacy
preserving data mining (PPDM) techniques are applied to preserve such confidential information from any type
of mining algorithm [1–6]. Hence, the basic objective of PPDM is to protect data against serious adverse effect.
In addition, the privacy regarding data mining is divided into 2 types. The first type of privacy, termed as
output privacy, is where the data are altered so that the mining result will conserve certain privacy. Many
modification techniques such as perturbation, blocking, aggregation, swapping, and sampling are used for this
type of privacy [7–15]. The second type of privacy, labeled as input privacy, is where the data are manipulated
so that the mining result is not affected or is less affected. Cryptography- and reconstruction-based techniques
are used for this type of privacy [16–20].
The mining association rule (AR) is a 2-step process. In step 1, the Apriori algorithm is used to mine
frequent k-itemsets [21] from huge amounts of data. In step 2, ARs are generated from frequent k-itemsets.
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Furthermore, a rule is called sensitive if its discloser risk is above a user-specified threshold. In addition, sensitive
rules contain confidential data that we do not want to disclose to the public. Example: consider 2 retailers, Bob
and Ali, in a supermarket. Bob is the experienced one and Ali has only recently joined the market. Now, Ali
wants to place those items or products that the customers purchase more or whose purchase ratio is high. For
this purpose, he wants to see Bob’s ARs, such as any customer of Bob’s who buys milk as well as tea. We call
this rule sensitive for Bob. Similarly, if Ali knows of any customer of Bob’s who buys milk as well as tea, he
runs a coupon scheme that offers some discounts on milk with the purchase of tea. Gradually, Bob’s sale of milk
with tea decreases and Ali’s sales increase. Consequently, Ali monopolizes the market, as shown in Figure 1.

TEA

TEA
TEA

TEA

Figure 1. PPDM supermarket example.

ARs can be divided into 2 subcategories: weak ARs (WARs) and strong ARs (StARs). A rule is called
a WAR if its confidence is lower than the user-specified threshold. Similarly, a rule is marked as a StAR if its
confidence is greater than or equal to the user-specified threshold. Moreover, StARs are further divided into
sensitive ARs (SARs) and nonSARs. Furthermore, 2 strategies are used to hide SARs [22].
• Increase support of the antecedent.
• Decrease support of the consequent.
This work is based on support and confidence framework. The support is the measure of the occurrences
rule in a transactional database, while the confidence is a measure of the strength of the relation between
of items. An AR is an implication of the form X ⇒ Y where X ⊆ I , Y ⊆ I , and X∩ Y = Ø, where
{i 1 , i2 , i3 . . . Im } is a set of literals, called items. X is called the body or antecedent (tail) of the rule

of a
sets
I =
and

Y is called the head or consequent of the rule. An example of such a rule is when 60% of the customers who
buy bread also buy butter. The confidence of the rule will be 100%, which means that 60% of the records that
contain bread also contain butter. The confidence of the rule is the number of records that contain both the
left-hand side (X) and right-hand side (Y ), divided by the number of records that contain the left-hand side
(X), which is calculated with the following formula:
Confidence (X ⇒ Y ) =

|X ∪ Y |
.
|X|

(1)

The support of the rule is the percentage of transaction that contains both the left-hand side (X) and
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right-hand side (Y ), which is calculated with the following formula:
Support (X ⇒ Y ) =

|X ∪ Y |
, where N is the number of transactions in D.
|Y |

(2)

A lot of research has been done in the domain of PPDM. Most of the existing techniques are based on
the support and confidence framework. In addition, we identify that these techniques are suffering from the
side effects of lost rules, some lost nonrestrictive patterns and ghost rules, and some new patterns are falsely
generated, which may not be supported by the original database. These side effects play an important role
in the motivation of the proposed architecture. In current research work, a genetic algorithm (GA) is used to
improve the existing PPDM in the domain of the lost rule and ghost rule side effects. Moreover, the GA is an
evolutionary and metaheuristic technique used to solve complex problems. Hence, preserving the privacy of ARs
is a complex problem and needs optimal sanitization. Therefore, the GA is used to provide the optimal solution
to such a hard problem. In the same direction, a new modification technique is introduced, called the privacy
preserving GA (PPGA). This technique modifies the database recursively until the support or confidence of
the restrictive patterns drop below the user-specified threshold. Furthermore, the technique is only applicable
on binary datasets. In addition, the technique introduced in this paper only modifies those transactions that
contain the maximum number of sensitive items and minimum number of availability of nonsensitive items. The
technique can be applicable for small datasets as well as for large datasets. In order to test and validate the
performance of the PPGA-based framework, experiments are conducted on the Zoo, Synthetic, and Extended
Bakery datasets. On the basis of the experimental results, the claim is validated that the proposed framework
gives better results than the existing state of the art techniques based on the rule hiding distance, not on lost
and ghost rules.
The work done in this paper can be divided into 3 phases. In phase 1, k-frequent itemsets are generated
and then ARs are generated from these itemsets. PPGA is applied to release a sanitized database in order to
hide SARs in the second phase. In phase 3, the original database is compared to the sanitized database, to find
the number of lost rules and ghost rules.
The format of this paper is as follows: Section 2 is a literature review, which describes the comprehensive
study on SARs hiding or PPDM in ARs. Section 3 presents the proposed model for PPDM, components of
PPGA, and its implementation. In Section 4 the experimental results of the proposed technique are compared
with other techniques existing in the literature. Section 5 describes the conclusions and future work.
2. Literature review
Sharing data is often beneficial but sometimes discloses confidential information. PPDM techniques are used to
preserve confidential information from unauthorized access. In this paper, we focus on issues regarding privacy
preserving in ARs (PPARs). In this context, we review the literature in order to analyze and find limitations in
the existing literature. Aggarwal and Yu [23] proposed that preserving the privacy of restrictive patterns refers
to the process of modifying the original database in such a way that some restrictive patterns hide without
seriously affecting the data and the nonrestrictive patterns. Generally, the process of modification can be
divided into data blocking and data distortion techniques. The major concept of data distortion techniques
is the replacement of selected values with ‘false’ values (i.e. replacing 1s with 0s and vice versa). Moreover,
this technique is applicable to reduce the support or confidence of the SARs from the user-specified threshold.
Analyses concerning the use of this technique can be found in Verykios et al. [24], Duraiswamy et al. [25],
and Dehkordi et al. [26]. All of these approaches add false values to the real transaction, which causes the
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problems of lost rule and ghost rule side effects. Similarly, the major concept of a blocking technique is the
replacement of an existing attribute value with ‘unknown’ or ‘?’. In a blocking technique, the algorithms do
not add a false value to the database. In addition, to restore a value by an unknown value instead of placing a
false value is slightly more advantageous for a specific application such as a medical application. Examinations
regarding the use of this technique can be found in Dasseni et al. [11], Weng et al. [27], and Saygin et al.
[15,28]. The solution presented in these approaches uses a blocking method to transform the original database
D into the release database D`, by increasing the support of the rule antecedent by changing 0s to ? or by
decreasing the support of the rule consequent by changing 1s to ?. Hence, compared to other techniques in the
literature, blocking-based techniques do not distort the database, they only change some of the known values to
unknown. The main limitation of this technique is the privacy violation of the modified database. For example,
the opponent can easily leak the information by replacing the question mark by 1s or 0s.
In the same direction, Clifton et al. [29] discussed the security issues and implication of data mining. He
did not propose any specific algorithm. Moreover, he investigated the idea of limiting access to the database;
supplementing data, remove needless combinations, audit and fuzzy data. Later on, Atallah et al. [30] proved
that optimal sanitization is a nondeterministic polynomial time (NP)-hard problem and needs standardization.
In their research, they proposed a heuristic based on support reduction, to exclude sensitive frequent itemsets.
In a similar direction, Verykios et al. [24] introduced 5 algorithms. Generally, these algorithms run on the
strategy that is based on reducing the support and confidence of rules. Moreover, here, distortion is used as a
modification technique. More precisely, none of these techniques are the best to overcome all of the side effects
caused by preserving the privacy of ARs. Similarly, the time taken by each algorithm to hide a set of rules is
also high. Chih-Chia et al. [31] proposed a novel algorithm, the fast hiding SARs (FHSARs). Typically, the
technique hides SARs successfully by establishing a correlation between the transaction and SARs. Generally,
the proposed technique assigns a weight W to each transaction. The weight shows the dependency of the
transaction on restrictive patterns. Moreover, it generates fewer new rules than the previous work done. The
bottleneck of FHSARs is the number of lost rules and performance in terms of W , which is computed again after
each item is modified. In the same direction, Dehkordi et al. [26] used a GA in the domain of privacy preserving
in ARs. In addition, the technique divided the database into safe and critical transactions. Safe transactions
are those that do not contain sensitive items and there is no need to sanitize. While critical transactions are
those that contain sensitive items and need to be sanitized. The solution presented in this approach uses the
distortion (replacing 1s by 0s and vice versa) method to transform the original database D into the release
database D`. Dehkordi et al. did not define a dataset for experimentation. Moreover, the side effect in terms of
the lost and ghost rules were not clearly defined. Furthermore, the technique was not compared to the previous
techniques existing in the literature. Moreover, in the support and confidence of ARs more recently, Naeem et
al. [32] proposed a novel architecture in the domain of PPDM. In this approach, the authors used 5 measures,
namely confidence, all-confidence, conviction, leverage, and lift, in order to mine ARs from large databases. In
addition, the author used a weighting mechanism, which was used to assign a weight to each transaction. The
weighting mechanisms used in this approach are, sum, mean, median, and mode. Consequently, the technique
is only applicable on datasets whose attributes are not more than 26. The technique generates 0 ghost rule side
effects. Furthermore, the technique generates high lost rule side effects.
3. Proposed model for the PPDM
It is clear from the literature that most of the techniques suffer from the side effects of lost rules and ghost
rules. These limitations play an important role in the motivation of the proposed architecture. In the current
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research work, the GA is used to counter the side effects of lost rules and ghost rules. This work has a partial
resemblance to the work done by Dehkordi et al. [26]. However, the difference is that we define our own fitness
strategy. The question arises, “Why are we using a GA in PPDM?” The answer to such a question is that
PPDM is an extremely complex domain and needs to be standardized [29]. Such standardization in PPDM
refers to a NP-hard problem [30]. Therefore, a GA is used to provide the optimal solution to the hard problem.
Such optimality of the solution depends on the complexity of the fitness function. The possible strength of
the fitness function ensures a desirable level of the optimal solution. A GA was developed by Holland in [33].
Holland’s GA is a method for moving from one population of ‘chromosomes’ (e.g., strings of ‘bits’ representing
candidate solutions to a problem) to a new population. In terms of the GA, the dataset is called a population
and the transaction is called a chromosome. Moreover, a GA is an evolutionary and metaheuristic technique
used to solve complex problems. Therefore, a GA is used to hide restrictive patterns, X → Y , by decreasing the
support of Y or by increasing the support of X . Furthermore, it often requires a ‘fitness function’. Hence, the
fitness function assigns a value to each transaction (chromosome) in the database (population). Additionally,
the fitness of the transaction depends on how well that transaction solves the problem at hand. The fitness is
calculated with the help of Eqs. (5) and (8).
Let D be a set of transactions in a dataset, denoted as D = {T 1 , T2 ,. . . . . . . . . .,T n } and let R be a set
of identifiers, defined as R = {1, 2,. . . . . . . . . .., n} . Each record Tr is defined as a set of data items, Tr =
{d 1 , d2 ,. . . . . . . . . . . . .d k } , where I represents a set of identifiers, I = {1, 2,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , k} .
Let S be a set of sensitive items or a sensitive pattern, denoted as S = {s1, s2, . . . . . . ...., sm} and let P
be a set of identifiers for the elements of S , defined as P = {1, 2, . . . . . . . . . . . . , m} .
∀Sp ∈ Tr

∨

Sp ∈
/ Tr , 1/

∑k
i=1

Count (Sp ) in Tr : Sp ≥ 1

(3)

di : di → [1]

(4)

e.g.: D = {T 1 , T 2 , T 3 }
T1 = {Bread, Butter}
T 2 = {Bread, Egg}
T3 = {Bread, Butter}
S p = {Bread, Butter}
Count (S p ) in T 2 = (Bread)
∑k
S p ∈ T 2 , i=1 Count (Sp ) in T2 = 1
∑k
1
1/
i=1 Count (Sp ) in T2 = ( 1 )
∀di ∈ Tr ,
e.g.: d i ∈ T 2 ,

∑k
i=1

∑k
i=1

di = (1 + 1) = 2

Let F be a set of fitness values, defined as F = {f 1 , f2 ,.. . . . . . ..f h } , and let V be a set of identifiers
for the elements of F , denoted as V = {1, 2,. . . . . . .h} .
∀fv ∈ Tr , where fv = 1/
e.g.:
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di = 2

∑k
i=1

Count (Sp ) in Tr +

∑n
i=1

di

(5)
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∑k
i=1

Count (Sp ) in T2 = 1

f v = (1/1) + 2 = 3
Eq. (5) shows that the fitness value depends on the number of sensitive items in a transaction. This means
that the fitness function is rule-oriented. Moreover, transactions are sorted in descending order on the basis of
the fitness value. Furthermore, the transaction having a lower fitness value will be selected for modification.
Hence, the fitness function goes toward maximization.
Let C be a set of chromosomes, denoted as C = {O 1 , O2 ,. . . . . . . . . .,O n } , and let S be a set of identifiers,
defined as S = {1, 2,. . . . . . . . . .., n} . Each record Os is defined as a set of items, Os = {o 1 , o2 ,. . . . . . . . . . . . .o k },
where I represents a set of identifiers, I = {1, 2,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , k} .
|D| = |C| |∀|Os | = |Tr |
D: = C ∧ T r : = O s
Sp ∈ Os ∀Sp ∈
/ Os , 1/

∑k
i=1

o i ∈ Os ,

∑k
i=1

Count (Sp ) in Os : Sp ≥ 1

(6)

oi : oi → [0]

(7)

The fitness for each offspring can be calculated by Eq. (8).
fv ∈ Os , where fv = 1/

∑k
i=1

Count (Sp ) in Os +

∑n
i=1

oi

(8)

The question arises, “How do we justify the fitness function?” The answer to such a question is that the
fitness function is divided into 2 parts. The first part is called transaction sensitivity; it increases the priority
by decreasing the value of those transactions that contain sensitive items, as shown in Eqs. (3) and (6). On
the basis of these equation transactions, those having the maximum number of sensitive items will be selected
for modification. The second part is called transaction priority; it increases the priority of selected transactions
containing the same number of sensitive items, as shown in Eqs. (4) and (7). In other words, we can say that
on the basis of Eq. (5), those transactions will be selected for modifications (to replace with offspring) that
contain the maximum number of sensitive items (availability of data items) and minimum number of data items.
In doing so, the lost rule side effect is minimized. Similarly, on the basis of Eq. (8), those offspring will be
selected to be replaced with transactions in the original database that contain the minimum number of sensitive
items and maximum number of nonavailability of the data items. By doing this, the ghost rule side effect is
minimized.
Definition 1 PPGA hides SARs successfully.
∃Sp ∈ T ∆Tr |∃!Sp ∈ Tr

(9)

Eq. (9) shows that the proposed technique hides SARs successfully, because the technique only modifies
those transactions in which sensitive items are present.
Definition 2 PPGA minimizes lost rule side effects.
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Sp ∈ Tr ∧ fv ∈ Tr |Tr ∆Os fv ∈ Tr : fv≤ fv+1

(10)

Eq. (10) shows that the lost rule is minimized because the technique selects those transactions to modify in
which fewer data items are available.
Definition 3 PPGA minimizes ghost rule side effects.
Sp ∈ Os ∧ fv ∈ Os |Tr = Os fv ∈ Os : fv ≥ fv+1

(11)

Eq. (11) illustrates that the ghost rule is minimized because the selected transactions are replaced by those
offspring in which the maximum number of data items are unavailable.
The notation used in the proposed architecture is shown in Table 1.
organization of the PPGA for hiding restrictive patterns.

Figure 2 shows the element

Table 1. Notation and definition.

Notation
D
D`
Tr
ARs
SARs
MCT
MST
fv
TMG
Os
LRs
GRs

Details
Original dataset
Sanitized dataset
Transaction ID
Association rules
Sensitive ARs
Minimum confidence threshold
Minimum support threshold
Fitness of each transaction (chromosome)
Transaction modified in each generation
Offspring ID
Lost rules
Ghost rules
Initial population

Original
Database

Generate

ARs

D
Comparison

Select

SARs

Injected

Initial population
D`

No

Sanitize
Database

Calculate
Fitness
Tournament
Selection
Single Point
Crossover

Ghost Rules

Mutation

Inversion
Update
Output

Figure 2. Framework of the PPGA for hiding SARs.

440

Exit

Yes

Output

Lost Rules

SAR≠ { }

Genetic
Algorithm

SHAH and ASGHAR/Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

3.1. Components of the PPGA
The components of the proposed model are divided into 3 phases, as shown in Figure 3.

1.
2.
Phase -1
3.
4.
5.
Phase -2
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
Phase -3
14.

Input:
Output:

Original Database D, SARs, MCT, MST, N, Replace
Transform D into D’

FS
Frequent Itemset (D)
AR
Generate Association Rules (FS)
SAR
Select Sensitive Association Rules (AR)
WHILE SAR{} != Ø OR generation != N
d : d i → [1]
Fitness:
f v=1/ ∑
Count(Sp) in T + ∑
Selection:
Base on f v
Crossover: Tr * T r+1
Mutation:
Select T r , Change 1 to 0 or 0 to 1 randomly
o : o i → [0]
Fitness:
f v= 1/ ∑
Count(Sp) in O + ∑
Replace:
Tr Δ Os
Wend
D

D`
Figure 3. PPGA.

In phase 1, the data are first converted into Boolean format, such as 1 and 0, where 1 represents the
availability of data items and 0 shows the nonavailability of data items. Next, the Apriori algorithm is applied
with some minimum support thresholds (MSTs) to mine k-frequent itemsets, and then ARs are generated from
these frequent itemsets. In addition, we select some of these ARs as SARs, whose confidences are greater than
or equal to the minimum confidence threshold (MCT).
In phase 2, the PPGA transforms the original database D into the sanitized database D`, such that
none of the SARs are derived. At first, the confidence of the SAR is obtained from the original dataset (initial
population) and compared with the MCT. If the confidence of the SAR is greater than or equal to the MCT,
then the fitness of each transaction is calculated by Eq. (3). Next, different operators of the PPGA are applied.
This phase of the PPGA runs repeatedly until SAR{} ! = Ø.
In phase 3, the original database D is compared to the modified database D`, to find the number of
ghost rule and lost rule side effects.
Tournament selection: In the tournament selection, 2 chromosomes are selected randomly from the
population and the most fit of these 2 is selected for the mating pool, as shown in Table 2.
Table 2. T-selection.

Population
11100
10100
10010
01011

Fitness
3.5
2.5
3.0
3.0

T-selection
10010
10100

10010

Single point crossover: In the single point crossover, the parent’s chromosome is split into 2 portions,
such as the head and tail. Similarly, the head of one chromosome combines with the tail of another chromosome
in the mating pool, as illustrated in Figure 4.
441

SHAH and ASGHAR/Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

Parent

Children

Figure 4. One-point crossover.

Mutation operator: The mutation operator randomly changes the values (1 to 0 or 0 to 1) of some
locations in the chromosome, as depicted in Figure 5.
Parent

1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1

Child

1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0

Figure 5. Mutation.

Replacement or inversion operator: In this operator, some of the chromosomes of the initial
population will be replaced with some of the chromosomes of the offspring, as depicted in Table 3. The
fitness values are calculated by Eq. (8).
Table 3. Inversion operation.

Population
11100
10100
10010
01011

Offspring
10100
11010
11100
11100

Mutation
00100
11110
10100
11000

Fitness
5.0
1.5
3.5
4.0

Inversion
11100
11000
10010
01011

Example: Table 4 shows the example dataset in comma-separated values (CSV) file format. The example
dataset contains 4 transactions and 5 items in each transaction.
Table 4. Example dataset.

Transaction ID
1
2
3
4

Items bought
Bread, Butter, Egg
Bread, Egg
Bread, Tea
Butter, Tea, Cake

If the MST is 50%, then {Bread, Egg} is the only 2-itemset that satisfies the minimum support, as shown
in Table 5. Thus, if the MST is increased from 50%, then the information of {Butter} and {Egg} is lost, which
affects the association of {Bread, Egg} . Hence, if the MST is decreased, then the ratio of unuseful information
is increased.
If the MCT is 50%, then only 2 rules are generated from this 2-itemset, which have confidences of greater
than 50%, as shown in Table 6. As we know, ARs are generated from the frequent itemset; therefore, the MCT
must be greater than or equal to the MST. In the current example, if the MCT is 66%, then the same result
will be shown. Similarly, if the MCT is 67%, then rule Bread → Egg is lost, which we want to hide.
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Table 5. Frequent itemset.

Frequent itemset
{Bread}
{Butter}
{Egg}
{Tea}
{Bread, Egg}

Support
75%
50%
50%
50%
50%

Table 6. ARs from the frequent itemset.

Antecedent
Bread
Egg

→
→
→

Consequent
Egg
Bread

Support
50%
50%

Confidence
66%
100%

Assume that rule Bread → Egg is sensitive or leaks confidential information and needs to be hidden. At
first, some input parameters, such as the initial population, MST, MCT, and SAR, are passed to the PPGA.
Later on, the PPGA calculates the fitness for each transaction. On the basis of fitness, transactions are selected
for the new generation. Hence, the fitness generated by one rule is deferred from another rule. However, the
fitness depends on the rule or is rule oriented. Table 7 describes the fitness of rule Bread → Egg generated from
example dataset.
Table 7. Fitness of the example dataset.

Population
11100
10100
10010
01011

Fitness
3.5
2.5
3.0
3.0

Table 8 demonstrates the first iteration or generation of the PPGA. In the next generation, the sensitivity
of the rule is checked by comparing the confidence and support of the rule to the user-specified threshold. If
the sensitivity of the rule is below the specified threshold, it means that the rule is hidden. Subsequently, the
modified dataset is compared to the original dataset to achieve the lost rule and ghost rule side effects.
Table 8. First iteration of the PPGA.

T-selection
10100
10010
10010
11100
10010
10010
11100
11100
10100
11100
11100
10100

X-over

Offspring

Mutation

Fitness

Inversion

10 010

10100

00100

5.0

11100

11 100

11010

11110

1.5

00100

11 100

11100

10100

3.5

10010

11 100

11100

11000

4.0

01011

Table 9 illustrates that after a single iteration of the PPGA, the support and confidence of rule
Bread → Egg drops below the user-specified threshold. Thus, the proposed technique hides SARs successfully.
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Due to this modification, rule Egg → Bread is falsely hidden, which is called a lost rule, and no new rule is
generated.
Table 9. Performance measure of the PPGA.

Performance measure
SAR
Lost rule

AR
Bread→Egg
Egg→Bread

Support
25%
25%

Confidence
50%
50%

3.2. Implementation
In this section, the screen shot of the PPGA is given. The development of the PPGA is coded in Java, using
NetBeans IDE 6.9.1 as a development tool. Java is selected as a programming language because of its prominent
features. Moreover, it provides a high performance graphical user interface. In addition, we perform a series of
experiments on a PC with a Core i3 ∼ 2.1-GHz central processing unit (CPU) and 4-GB memory, under the
Windows 7 Professional 64-bit operating system. At first, the data that are in the CSV file format are imported

Figure 6. Mining frequent itemsets and ARs from the synthetic dataset.
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to the MySQL database. After this, the Apriori algorithm is used to mine the frequent k-itemset. Figure 6
describes the ARs generated from frequent k-itemsets before and after sanitization from the synthetic dataset,
which will be discussed later on. It indicates the SAR 4→ 7, with a support of 41% and confidence of 81%.
The rule is hidden by decreasing the confidence to 74%, as shown in the column of the ARs from the sanitized
dataset. Moreover, Figure 6 also represents the lost rule, which is 7→ 4. During this hiding process, no ghost
rules are generated and the number of transactions modified is 766.
Figure 7 represents the number of steps involved in the PPGA. It also depicts the number of repetitions
or iterations of the PPGA. In addition, Figure 7 also shows what the support and confidence values of the
SARs will be for the next generation. The process will stop when the support or confidence drops below the
user-specified threshold. It also indicates that each iteration of the PPGA decreases the confidence of the rule.
To test and validate the PPGA, experiments are conducted on the Zoo dataset [34], Synthetic dataset
[35], and Extended Bakery dataset [36]. Moreover, the experiments are performed on those data items that are
in Boolean format or are convertible to Boolean format. The data items that we cannot convert to Boolean
data will be removed, as shown in Table 10.

Figure 7. Hiding process of the PPGA.
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Table 10. Dataset.

Dataset
Zoo
Synthetic
Extended Bakery

Total records
101
10,000
20,000

Total attributes
17
8
50

Ordinal attributes
15
8
50

4. Results and discussion

33
30
27
24
21
18
15
12
9
6
3
0

ARs

Zoo(101)

FK-Itemset

MST%
MST

1.760
1.600
1.440
1.280
1.120
960
800
640
480
320
160
0

Quantity

Percentage

In this section, we perform some experiments on each dataset described in the previous section. Initially, the
MST is set for each experiment. In the first step, the frequent k-itemset is mined from each dataset. After
this, ARs are generated from the frequent k-itemset. Figure 8 depicts frequent k-itemsets (Fk-itemset) and
their corresponding ARs with some MSTs. The X-axis represents the sizes of the Zoo, Synthetic, and Extended
Bakery datasets, and the left-hand side of the Y-axis describes the MST for each dataset. The right-hand side of
the Y-axis indicates the number of frequent k-itemsets and their corresponding ARs generated for each dataset.
As the MST decreases the number of Fk-itemsets, the ARs will increase and vice versa, considering that some
of these ARs leak confidential information. We call this a SAR or sensitive pattern. The SARs are randomly
selected on the basis of their support and confidence.

Synthetic (10k) Extended Bakery (20k)
Datasets

Figure 8. Frequent k-itemsets and their corresponding ARs.

Three parameters play an important role in the rule hiding process, such as the MST, MCT, and number
of transactions modified in each generation (TMG) of the PPGA. Therefore, if the values of these parameters
are changed, then the result will be changed. Moreover, we conduct several experiments on each dataset. The
parameters are set for each experiment. Additionally, the hiding process loses some nonsensitive patterns, called
lost rules, and new patterns are also generated, called ghost rules. Thus, the optimal sanitization is a NP-hard
problem. The PPGA preserves the privacy of the restrictive patterns by decreasing the ghost rules to 0 and the
lost rules to 1 in most of the cases.
Figure 9 illustrates the experimental results of the PPGA. The X-axis describes the sizes of the different
datasets and the left-hand side of the Y-axis indicates the different parameter settings and number of transactions
modified during the hiding process. Similarly, the right-hand side of the Y-axis represents the lost rule and ghost
rule side effects. In other words, the bar represents the deferent parameter settings and modified transactions,
while the line represents the number of rules lost and generated due to sanitization. This shows that the
proposed technique generates between 0 and 3 lost rules, and minimizes the ghost rule side effects to 0. It also
shows the number of transactions modified during the hiding process. The flow of the graph shows that as the
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size of the database is increased, the side effects of the lost rules, ghost rules, and transaction modifications are
decreased.
MST%

MCT%

LRs

GRs
3.3

80

3

72

2.7

64

2.4

56
48

2.1
1.8

40

1.5

32

1.2

24
16
8

0.9
0.6
0.3

0

Quantity

Percentage

TMG%
88

0
Zoo(101)

Synthetic( 10k )

Extended Bakery( 20k )

Datasets

Figure 9. Experimental results of the PPGA.

On the basis of the experimental results, we claim that the proposed architecture hides SARs successfully
with no hiding failure. Moreover, the approach used in this work minimizes the side effects of the lost rules
and ghost rules. Furthermore, minimizing the number of transaction modifications remains. Additionally, one
accidental measure that we find is the CPU time, which is the amount of time taken by the PPGA to preserve
the privacy of the confidential information. For small datasets, it is not a problem; however, for large datasets,
the PPGA requires a huge amount of CPU time to preserve the privacy of the ARs.
The idea of using a GA for preserving the privacy of SARs was first introduced by Dehkordi et al. [26].
They performed experiments on example datasets that contained 5 transactions and 6 items in each record.
They did not perform experiments on large databases. Therefore, we do not compare the proposed technique to
their work. The proposed technique is compared to the techniques presented by Verykios et al. [24], Chih-Chia
et al. [31], and Naeem et al. [32].

No of lost rules and ghost rules

LRs
40
36
32
28
24
20
16
12
8
4
0
Alg 1.a

Alg 1.b

Alg 2.a

Alg 2.b

GRs

Alg 2.c

FHSAR

Novel
PPGA
Architecture

Techniques

Figure 10. Comparison of the PPGA with the existing techniques averaged over 3 datasets: Zoo, Synthetic, and
Extended Bakery.

Figure 10 represents the comparison of the PPGA to other techniques in the literature. It shows that these
techniques minimize the side effects in one direction, such as the minimized ghost rule side effects and remaining
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or ignored lost rule side effects. It also shows that the proposed technique hides SARs by decreasing the ghost
rule side effects to 0. Figure 10 also shows that the PPGA generates between 0 and 3 lost rules. Similarly,
the proposed technique hides SARs successfully with no hiding failure. On the basis of such a comparison, the
claim is validated that the PPGA outperforms the other techniques presented in the literature.
5. Conclusion
Organizations often share data in order to achieve mutual benefits. However, sharing data most often discloses
confidential data. Therefore, data modification or data sanitization techniques are applied to preserve the
confidentiality of their confidential data or restrictive patterns in the form of SARs. Moreover, it preserves the
privacy of restrictive patterns by concealing the frequent itemsets subsequent to those patterns. This process
overcomes the leak of confidential information while sharing data. By doing this, it has an impact on the
effectiveness of the data in the form of lost nonrestrictive patterns and new pattern generation. The problem
of optimal sanitization is very complex or NP-hard [6]. In the current research work, a GA is used to minimize
the impact of data hiding. In the same direction, a new fitness strategy is defined that calculates the fitness
of each transaction. Moreover, the proposed technique hides sensitive patterns or SARs successfully, as the
technique only modifies those transactions in which sensitive items are present. Furthermore, the technique
presented in this paper minimizes the lost rules, as the technique selects those transactions to modify that
contain the maximum number of sensitive items and minimum number of availability of nonsensitive items.
Similarly, the PPGA generates 0 ghost rules because the selected transactions are replaced by those offspring in
which the minimum number of sensitive items are available and the maximum number of nonsensitive items are
unavailable. Additionally, to test and validate the PPGA, experiments are performed on the Zoo, Synthetic,
and Extended Bakery datasets. Similarly, the experimental results of the PPGA are compared to the techniques
presented by Verykios et al. [24], Chih-Chia et al. [31], and Naeem et al. [32]. Thus, the claim is verified that
the PPGA outperforms the other techniques in the literature.
In the future, we will design a confidence base PPGA. It will improve the existing fitness function of the
PPGA. Moreover, it will modify those items in a sensitive transaction that will reduce the confidence of the
rule. Additionally, we shall apply other evolutionary approaches, to preserve the privacy of SARs.
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